Republic
Act 10372 was signed into law last February 28, 2013. It amends certain provisions of Republic Act
8293 more commonly known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. It became controversial due to the fact that
its amendments, according to critics, violate constitutional rights of the
people such as the right to due process, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and the equal protection clause. Its passing and signing into law was not
highly publicized as there were more pressing issues our country (and the
media) focused on during those times (Sabah/Kiram
issue.)
To
address the constitutional issues, the government on its official web portal www.gov.ph, through its post, “FAQs to the
amendments to the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines,” answered what
it held to be the most frequently asked questions (FAQ’s) as regards RA
10372. There were six (6) FAQs which the
post seeks to clarify in very simple and short terms.
The
task is to look into the Q&A post by the government and see if the
questions were satisfactorily answered based on the amending law and to include
some meaningful comments.
FIRST
ISSUE
Question: Am I still allowed to import books, DVDs, and
CDs from abroad?
Answer: Yes. In fact,
the amendments to the Intellectual Property Code have removed the original
limitation of three copies when bringing legitimately acquired copies of
copyrighted material into the country. Only the importation of pirated or infringed
material is illegal. As long as they were legally purchased, you can bring as
many copies you want, subject to Customs regulations.
Comment: The
answer seems correct as Sec 14 of RA 10372 provides that:
“Sections 190.1. and
190.2. of Republic Act No. 8293 are deleted in their entirety.”
Said sections of RA 8293 provided
for limitations as to the number of original/non-infringed copies of
copyrighted materials allowed to be brought into the country. It allows one (1) copy if for personal use
while up to three (3) copies if for other purposes such as religious, research
and educational ones. The entire
sections having been removed may be interpreted as removing the said
limitations and allowing as much copies as a person would want to bring into
the country, subject to customs regulations, and for as long as copies qualify
under the “fair use” as provided under intellectual property laws.
The critics were doubtful and
suspicious as to the removal of said sections previously setting a limit which
actually protects the individual for as long the number of copies one would bring
does not exceed such limit. They worry
that the removal may actually work against those who would want to bring a copy
home with them as perhaps they fear that now any amount of copy of a copyrighted
material would trigger the suspicion from authorities leading to a possible
intrusion into ones rights.
The government having clarified that
such removal opens for individuals to carry as much “legal” copies, I would
have to take their word for it and concede that since Intellectual Property
laws only seek to deter introduction of infringing copies into the country,
then it is right to say that the removal of the sections actually removed the
limits. Perhaps the procedure for
determination in points of entry, if for example there are multiple copies of a
copyrighted material brought in, is another story and would be properly
addressed by the implementing rules and regulations.
The answer puts in perspective the
main issue here under the intellectual property law which is the legality or
illegality of the acquisition of a material, and not the number of copies,
carried into the country.
SECOND ISSUE
Question: Is the reproduction of copyrighted material
for personal purposes punishable by this law?
Answer: No.
Infringement in this context refers to the economic rights of the copyright
owner. So, if you transfer music from a lawfully acquired CD into a computer,
then download it to a portable device for personal use, then you didn’t commit
infringement. But if, for example, you make multiple copies of the CD to sell,
then infringement occurs.
Comment: The answer doesn’t appear responsive to the
question. It provides a contextual reply
and then proceeds by giving a situation-based example which is about data
transfer and not about reproduction.
At
best, the reproduction only addressed by the answer is the reproduction of code
under Section 185.1 of RA 10372 which it defines as “decompilation” and in more
detail:
“which
is understood here to be the reproduction of the code and translation of the
forms of a computer program to achieve the interoperability of an independently
created computer program with other programs may also constitute fair use under
the criteria established by this section, to the extent that such decompilation
is done for the purpose of obtaining the information necessary to achieve such
interoperability.
Reproduction, under section 171.9 of
the amending law, is defined as:
“the making of one
(1) or more copies, temporary or permanent, in whole or in part, of a work or a
sound recording in any manner or form without prejudice to the provisions of
Section 185 of this Act.”
If
one is to look closely at both RA 8293, the old law and RA 10372, the amending
law, “reproduction” is allowed even without the consent of the copyright owner only
in very special circumstances.
Among
the special situations are mentioned in Sections 184, 185 and 188.1 of RA 8293. Sec. 184 provides for “specialized
format exclusively for the use of the blind, visually- and reading-impaired
persons” with further qualification that such “be made on a nonprofit basis and
shall indicate the copyright owner and the date of the original publication.” On the otherhand section 185 lists what are situations
of “fair use” that dies not consist infringement of copyright while under Sec. 188.1
if reproduction is for reprographic or preservation purposes then it is allowed
even without consent of the author or copyright owner provided that they be
reproduced only in limited copies.
Taking note of
the aforementioned sections, it is clear that reproduction may only be done
under very exceptional circumstances and for exceptional purposes, otherwise
these qualifications should not have been provided at all.
Nowhere under
the amending law, RA 10372, was non-profit reproduction of copyrighted
materials for personal purposes mentioned as being allowed.
It
would have been better if the government’s answer to the FAQ qualified the
definition and extent of “personal purpose.”
The
implied effect of the law is that reproduction is allowed and is not an
infringement of copyright if, although seemingly done in public, it is done for
purposes of going beyond the music or to “digest” it further such as in
research, criticism, comment, news reporting, and not for the sake of merely
listening to it or sharing it to the public.
RA 8293, Chapter XV, Section 212,
provided for the exceptions which included “personal purpose” but Sec 21 of RA
10372 amended the said section, mutatis
mutandis, providing that what should now apply when it comes to
reproduction of performances (for the performer and producers alike) would be Chapter
VIII on Reproduction of Copyrights.
Chapter VIII however does not provide for a discussion of “personal
purposes” and in relation to the first FAQ in the post, the limitation for
importation for personal use was completely deleted. It only provides for an exclusive list of
what does not constitute infringement and “personal purposes” is not included.
The answer to this second issue is inadequate to
address the question directly, as the law itself appears to be.
THIRD ISSUE
Question: Is the possession
of, for example, a music file procured through an infringing activity a
violation of this law?
Answer: Only if it can be proven that the person benefitting from the
music file has knowledge of the infringement, and the power and ability to
control the person committing the infringement.
Comment: The answer
provided above is based on Sec 216 (b) of RA 10372. The section however does not talk of mere
possessing but beneffiting from the infringed material and so therefore
the answer is not responsive to the question.
The law does not of itself provide an answer as to whether mere
possession would punishable. One
provision, Sec. 216.1 (6) 2nd par., however implies that the act of infringing
itself, whether or not known to the offender who happens to commit it, is civilly
punishable. Still that part does not
address the question on mere possession.
FOURTH ISSUE
Question: Is jailbreaking or rooting[*] my phone or device illegal?
Answer: No.
Jailbreaking or rooting by themselves are not illegal. However, downloading
pirated material, or committing infringement with a “jailbroken” phone
increases the penalty and damages imposed on the person found guilty of
infringement.
Comment:
On this Q&A, the government is correct in
stating that jailbreaking otherwise known as rooting is not illegal. This is
primarily based on the US Library of Congress’ declaration back in July 2010
that it is a right of all owners of products such as Iphone and Ipad.
Rightly so, jailbreaking allows the
owner of the Iphone, Ipad or other like devices to maximize its use by removing
the restrictions set by the manufacturer as regards various features made
available by other technology providers and developers of software applications. The product is not altered. The usability, flexibility and enjoyment of
the device are increased, to the benefit of the owner.
FIFTH ISSUE
Question: Are mall owners liable for infringement
activities of their tenants?
Answer: Mall owners are not automatically penalized for the
infringing acts of their tenants. When a mall owner or lessor finds out about
an infringement activity, he or she must give notice to the tenant, then he or
she will be afforded time to act upon this knowledge. As stated above, the law
requires that one must have both proven knowledge of the infringement, and the
ability to control the activities of the infringing person, to be held liable.
The mall owner must also have benefitted from the infringement.
Comment: I would have to agree that subject to certain
conditions, the mall owner may be held liable for acts of infringements
committed by his tenants. It should be
presumed that the owner shall ultimately be the one to blame not just if he has
actual knowledge and control of the situation but if there is a proliferation
of the infringing activities. Such should lead authorities to safely assume
that he is tolerating the violation of intellectual property laws in exchange
for the profit earned through the rents paid him.
Under Section 217.3 of RA 8293 it is
not just the fact that the possessor of the article knows that it is a product
of infringement which could be the basis for his liability but he may also be
held liable if he “ought to know” or perhaps, should know. In the same wise, the mall owners should be
held accountable if on its face there appears to be an encouragement of selling
or displaying products inside the establishment which were obviously infringed,
by the fact that many of the said items are being sold by most of the store
operators, even at least, on a particular section of the mall. Obvious here may be determined by whether the
store owners or sellers have the proper rights to distribute the items they are
selling, or just basing on the price of an original and an infringed item, or
simply due to the history of the place or establishments.
To qualify the “non-automatic” penalizing
of the mall owners only based on their knowledge and control would hamper the
drive to discourage copyright infringement in malls and major
establishment. It may be circumvented and
be used as an excuse in denying liability.
There is a need to stress that there are instances that mall owners “ought
to know” that such illegal activities are going on inside their establishments
so that they too would be the ones vigilant in the fight for the rights of
artists, producers and the like, in protecting the products of their creativity. That way, the amendment brought about by sec
216 (b) of RA 10372, pertaining to knowledge and control, would be more
effective.
SIXTH ISSUE
Question: Is it legal for the Intellectual Property
Office (IPO) to visit businesses to conduct searches based on reports,
information, and complaints?
Answer: The IPO may
visit establishments based on reports and complaints; this in itself is
constitutional. However, if the IPO intends to perform a search and seizure, it
must comply with constitutional requirements, such as having a search warrant.
A warrant wouldn’t be required, however, if the IPO is accompanied by the
Bureau of Customs or the Optical Media Board—two agencies that can perform a
search and seizure on their own right without a warrant (per Republic Act No.
1937 and 9239, respectively).
Comment: This would be among the more controversial issues
among these FAQ’s as this part is where the law intended to expand the powers
of the Intellectual Porperty Office (IPO), or at least it attempted to do so.
It
was merely an attempt as there was not a clear discussion as to the purpose of
such visiting power and to what action the IPO may take if it is found that
there is a violation of the IP law.
There was a patent attempt to liken the IPO to become just like what
other govenment agencies such as the Optical Media Board (OMB), National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) and Bureau of Customs (BoC) are capable of when it comes
to enforcing laws subject of their respective jurisdictions.
There
are two things which the above mentioned agencies can do which the IPO has not
yet possessed even with the passing of RA 10372. First, the said agencies can act on their
own, the IPO cannot and has to await complaints by artists, authors and other
copyright holders. Second is that these
agencies can enforce on their own, which the IPO cannot do. Under the amended Section 7 of the
intellectual property law, the IPO Director and his Deputy Director can:
Undertake enforcement
functions supported by (emphasis supplied) concerned agencies such as the Philippine
National Police, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Customs,
the Optical Media Board, and the local government units, among others;
Without giving the IPO the power to
act and enforce on its own, RA 10372 merely re-designates the Intellectual
Property Office as a “middleman” kind of government agency tasked to accept
complaints and coordinate with other government agencies for purposes of enforcement. The “visiting” powers conferred by RA 10372 is
rendered purposeless for it seems there was no need to include it in the law if
the only power that the IPO has, on its own, is exactly to visit since it has to have assistance if it wants
to pursue further actions against violators.
The legality of their visiting power
as conferred by Sec 7 (d) law and all the more their non-existent right to perform
search and seizure operations on their own, as attempted to be created by sec 7
(d) need not be discussed here as there is none in, or if there is, it can only
be said to be useless and purposeless.
Final Comment:
Noticeable
is the fact that in the end the post provides that:
“The procedure and safeguards for this are to be spelled out
in the Implementing Rules and Regulations.”
Perhaps
that would be the reason why the six (6) questions and answers would appear to
be very straightforward and doesn’t appear to be apprehensive about
constitutional rights issues as it would when critics would attack the amendatory
law. The government maybe confident that
whatever loopholes the wordings of RA 10372 have, the IRR would be able to cover. However, according to critics of RA 10372,
such as Professor Jj Disini, the implementing rules cannot suffice to fix the
loopholes of a law since one cannot write something on the IRR which is
contrary to law and the it would be impossible to address every flaw, the very
reason why there is an injunction on the Cybercrime Law.